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RUMINATIONS ON THE WORK OF
FREDERICK SCHAUER
Richard H. Fallon,Jr.*

Over many years of reading Fred Schauer's work, and learning
from it, I have sometimes agreed and sometimes disagreed with his
positions, but always I have felt challenged and engaged. In this essay,
I want to pay tribute by ruminating on some of Schauer's themes.
Among the upshots of my ruminations is a question whether several of
his most important and influential ideas may not be in some tension
with one another.
My ruminations mainly concern four of Schauer's texts. I begin
with a brief, largely uncritical appreciation of an essay entitled The
Second-Best FirstAmendment,' in which I first encountered-Schauer's im-

portant, recurring theme that legal rules have a crucial role as devices
for the allocation of decisionmaking power. Subsequent sections consider whether some of Schauer's well-known jurisprudential writings-notably his influential book Playing by the Rules2 and his article
Rules and the Rule of Law,3 which advance a theory that he labels "presumptive positivism"-are consistent with the account of rules as devices for the allocation of power that is offered in The Second-Best First
Amendment. Although any surface inconsistency could probably be repaired, I conclude that Schauer's jurisprudential theory of presumptive positivism would need to be both expanded and partly
compromised for all of his central claims to be made fully consistent
with one another. I then reflect critically on Schauer's recent, impor*

Professor of Law, Harvard University. I am gratefil to Kirsten Mayer for

research and editorial assistance.
1

Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendmen

31 WM. & MAR L. REv. 1

(1989) [hereinafter Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment].
2 FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION

OF

RULE-BASED DECISION-MAING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991) [hereinafter SCHAUER, PLAY-

ING BY THE RuLEs].
3 Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HAv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645

(1991) [hereinafter Schauer, Rules].
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tant article, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution.4 Among
other observations, this discussion yields the question whether
Schauer's insights about the "presuppositions" of our constitutional
order-to cite the concept that his article has helpfully introduced
into debates about the theory of constitutional amendment-accord
with the semantic theory that underlies some of his claims about rulebased decisionmaking in law.
Although I shall raise some other issues along the way, my principal complaint, if I have one, may be that Schauer has too many good
ideas for all of them to fit together neatly.
I.

THE SECOND-BEST FIRST AMENDMENT

The Second-Best FirstAmendment5 develops an important theme that
resonates throughout Schauer's subsequent writing: There is a vital
distinction between a substantive or regulatory rule-a prescription to
act or refrain from acting in a particular way-and the background
values thatjustify the prescription. 6 For example, it might be the purpose of the First Amendment to respect individual autonomy, to promote the discovery of truth, or to support a well-functioning political
democracy. 7 But the rules implementing the First Amendment seldom direct that cases should be resolved on the basis of an all-thingsconsidered assessment of what would be best in light of underlying
values. We have, instead, rules established by such well-known cases as
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan8 and Brandenburg v. Ohio9 that rather
rigidly constrain decisionmakers. Sometimes the constraint is painful.
Once laid down, a First Amendment rule may occasionally require
decisionmakers to reach less than optimal results in particular cases,
as measured by the values underlying the rule.' 0
The insight can be generalized. Legal rules, Schauer suggests,
are inherently second-best. An ideal decisionmaker, permitted to
make all-things-considered judgments, would be able to reach the best
possible result in every case. Rules, by contrast, bind a decisionmaker
to prescriptions laid down in advance by rule-making authorities act4 Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositionsof a Constitution, in RESPONDING
TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 145
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions].
5 Schauer, Second-Best FirstAmendment, supra note 1.
6 See id. at 11-12.
7 See id. at 4.
8 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
9 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
10 See Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 1, at 7, 13.
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ing with less than perfect knowledge and foresight." It is therefore
an endemic feature of rules that they yield less than optimal results.
Nonetheless, there are good reasons why we sometimes want rules,
12
despite their inherent deficiencies as measured against the ideal.
Among these reasons is that all human decisionmaking, including
that by judges, is prone to error. And sometimes it is relatively predictable that judges, or other decisionmakers, will be likely to make
particular kinds of errors-overestimating certain kinds of harm or
risk, for example-if authorized to make all-things-considered
3
decisions'
Schauer's point is a deep one. Having rules confers benefits, but
the benefits always come at a price. One of the questions that Schauer
presses is when this price is worth paying, in light of the alternative
price that we would pay for not having rules. 14 As he takes pains to
point out, it would be impossible to provide a general answer to this
overbroad and imprecise question. But a crucial consideration is that
legal rules are devices for the allocation of power. 15 Although an
ideal decisionmaker would be able to make better all-things-considered decisions than rule-based decisionmaking permits, we know that
actual decisionmakers frequently are far less than ideal. Partly as a
result, modem constitutional doctrine does not, for example, generally trust police officers to make all-things-considered judgments
about whether it would be desirable to conduct warrantless searches
of houses.' 6 We do not trust legislatures to make all-things-considered
judgments about whether to restrict the expression of obnoxious or
even dangerous ideas in a public forum. And we do not trust judges,
or even Justices of the Supreme Court, to make all-things-considered
judgments about whether anyone should be punishable for treason in
the absence of "the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act,
17
or... Confession in open Court."
A common form of legal analysis condemns "formalist" adherence to rules in cases in which an all-things-considered assessment of
relevant values would dictate a different result.' 8 But Schauer reminds us that it is impossible to have the benefits of all-things-considered decisionmaking without the costs. To authorize an official11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See id. at 16-17.
See id. at 14-17.
See iii
See id. at 9, 14.
See id. at 14 n.46, 20 n.53.
See id. at 15.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
See Frederick Schauer, Forma/ism, 97 YAI. LJ.509 (1988).
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whether a police officer or a judge-to disregard a rule is to shift
power enormously from the rule-maker or system designer to the official with front-line decisionmaking responsibility. 19
In my view, The-Second Best FirstAmendment is a small gem of an
article. It provides, first, a plausible account, elaborated in Schauer's
later work, of the nature of rule-based decisionmaking. Within this
account, rules are "entrenched generalizations" 20 with some capacity
to preclude those to whom they are addressed from making decisions
on an all-things-considered basis or even on the basis of the rule's
background justifications. 21 If rules were not "opaque" to their background justifications to at least some extent-if they could be disregarded whenever a decisionmaking official thought that applying the
rule would yield a sub-optimal result-they would not be "rules" in
any meaningful sense. Second, The Second-Best FirstAmendment situates
rule-based decisionmaking in a legal system, which is itself located in a
broader culture, and thus invites attention to questions of where decisionmaking authority of different kinds ought to be located.2 2 Among
other things, Schauer's perspective provides an important counterbalance to prominent theories, such as that of Ronald Dworkin, 23 that
are idealized and judge-centered. It is small exaggeration to say that
Dworkin develops his theory by assuming the vantage point of a morally and intellectually ideal judge, Hercules, who displays an incessant,
personal preoccupation with achieving a body of law that is consistent
in principle. In considering issues of institutional design, Schauer is
right to remind us that not every judge possesses herculean capacities
and, what is more, that judges are only one among many classes of
decisionmakers to whom legal rules are addressed. Dworkin's "interpretive protestantism" 2 4 may at least look more problematic once the
lens is widened and the full set of legal decisionmakers is seen in lifelike detail.
I could, of course, raise some quibbles and deprecations concerning The Second-Best FirstAmendment. In its emphasis on the function of
19 See Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 1, at 20 n.53.
20 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 191.
21 See Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 1, at 10-12.
22 See id. at 14-23.
23 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY].

24 See DOWRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 413 (characterizing his theory as
embracing "a protestant attitude that makes each citizen responsible for imagining
what his society's public commitments to principle are, and what these commitments
require in new circumstances").
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rules in allocating power and determining action by law-applying officials, the article may pay insufficient heed to other functions of rules,
such as facilitating coordinated activity and providing clear notice of
rights and obligations.2 5 When these functions are taken into account, the notions of the "ideal" and the "second-best" become more
complex than Schauer expressly acknowledges. In addition, many of
the article's best insights, though presented in a fresh and arresting
way, have close
analogues in previous work contrasting "rules" with
"standards."26 Finally, as I shall discuss further below, 27 I think that
there may be somewhat broader scope for the "interpretation" of legal
rules than some of Schauer's formulations (even if not his formal position) may suggest.
But the quibbles are little more than that. The Second-Best First
Amendment provides a valuable template for thinking about how first
amendment doctrine ought to be structured and, more generally, for
thinking about the role of rules in law.
II.

PRESUMPTIVE

PosITvIsM

Since The Second-Best FirstAmendment, Schauer has continued his
exploration of the nature and functions of rules. His most extensive
discussion comes in an important and broad-ranging book, Playingby
the Rules: A PhilosophicalExamination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in
Law and in Life.28 The book is richly illuminating along many dimensions. In particular, Schauer expands his account of what rules are
and how they work, and he has much to say about how different kinds
of rules can and must function in law. In both Playing y the Rules and
29
a roughly contemporaneous article, Rules and the Rule of Law,
Schauer presents his most important claims about legal rules as aspects of a theory that he calls "presumptive positivism."3 0 In an earlier
writing, I spoke enthusiastically of presumptive positivism. 31 More recently, I have had second thoughts. Although I continue to think that
Schauer provides a valuable perspective on the nature and functions
of legal rules, I have grown doubtful that presumptive positivism suc25

Schauer refers to such functions, but only fleetingly. See Schauer, Second-Best

First Amendmen supra note 1, at 14.
26 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89

HARv. L. R'v. 1685 (1976).
27

See infra Part V.

28

SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES,

supra note 2.

29 Schauer, Rules, supra note 3.
30 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULS, supra note 2, at 196-206.
31 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Common Law Court or Council of Reision2, 101 YALE

L.J. 949 (1992) (book review).
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ceeds as a general jurisprudential theory.3 2 To express my reservation
only slightly more concretely, I question whether presumptive positivism offers sufficiently clear and useful answers to the particular questions about the nature of law that it sets out to answer.
A.

Rules in Law

Schauer argues persuasively that it is impossible to imagine a
legal system that is not largely an "affair of rules" 3 3 -rules that have
the allocation of power as a central function. In elaborating this
claim, Schauer distinguishes two types of rules. 'Jurisdictional rules"
assign power to render particular kinds of decisions.3 4 For example,
legislatures are empowered by rule to enact statutes regulating private
conduct, and courts are given responsibility for adjudicating disputes.
In contrast with jurisdictional rules establishing decisionmaking institutions, substantively constraining or "regulative" rules determine the
particular decisions that duly constituted decisionmaking institutions
must make.3 5 The concept of law or of a legal system, Schauer interestingly argues, does not require "a substantial array of outcome-determining rules sharply limiting the decisionmakers' judgment or
discretion." 3 6 But while law does not require regulatory rules, neither,
Schauer argues, does it forbid them. Substantive or regulatory rules
are common in our legal system and, as suggested in The Second-Best
FirstAmendment, frequently bind judges and other decisionmakers. Or
do they?
Building on ideas that he attributes to Ronald Dworkin and
Duncan Kennedy,37 Schauer sketches (for the purpose of addressing)
a forceful challenge to the notion that rules actually bind judges as a
32 Cf Ruth Gavison, Comment: Legal Theory and the Role of Rules, 14 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 727, 730-31 (1991) (distinguishing a theory of rules and their role from a
theory of law).
33

Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 651; see SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs, supra

note 2, at 168.
34 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 169-74; see also Schauer,
Rules, supra note 3, at 651-54 (discussing empowering rules that create decisionmaking environments).
35 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs, supra note 2, at 171-74; see also Schauer,

Rules, supra note 3, at 651 (discussing "regulatory" rules).
36

Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 654; see also id. at 657 ("[A] system employing

empowering rules but leaving substantive decisionmaking authority largely unconstrained by external legal rules seems both pragmatically plausible and accepted as
'law' within the world in which we now exist."); SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra
note 2, at 172.

37

See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 200-02; Schauer, Rules,

supra note 3, at 667-77.
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matter of law. The challenge begins with an empirical observation:
there are cases, including well-known cases, 38 in which judges have
rejected or modified an applicable legal rule based on the perception
that applying the rule would be unacceptable in light of other norms
that are generally recognized within the society.3 9 Nor, Schauer suggests, can such cases be dismissed as aberrant instances ofjudicial de4°
fault of legal duty. Cases in which judges have held "local,"
applicable rules not binding are too numerous, and many of them are
too much respected as paradigms of good judging, for this explanation to work.4 1 Looking at cases such as these, others have suggested
that what are commonly taken to be legal "rules" are really no more
than "rules of thumb."42 Unlike "rules" as Schauer uses the term,
"rules of thumb" do not purport to block all-things-considered decisionmaking on the facts of any particular case. 43
38 Schauer structures much of his discussion around Riggs v. Palmer,22 N.E. 188
(N.Y. 1889), which held that a killer could not inherit under the will of his victim, and
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960), which held that a consumer's waiver of a warranty on an automobile was invalid, even though not fraudulently obtained, because enforcement would be contrary to public policy.
39 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 200-02.
40 Schauer introduces the concept of "locality" to resolve some otherwise apparent conflicts occurring within complex rule systems. See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE
RULES, supra note 2, at 188-91. He relies heavily on an example to elucidate what he
means:
Consider the difference between two rules, one requiring all drivers to drive
safely at all times and another setting a minimum speed of 40 miles per hour
on a certain stretch of limited-access highway... [A]Ithough many cases
can be imagined in which two (or more) potentially conflicting rules are
applicable, one of the rules may seem more applicable, or, to put it better,
more directly applicable. The rule that is less general, and applicable to a
smaller number of events, seems to be more applicable to the events to
which it does apply.
Id. at 189 (emphasis in original). According to Schauer, "for rules to operate as rues
within a system of rules ....
they must be treated as entrenched generalizations with
respect to other [less directly applicable] rules as well, and it is that relationship that
the idea of local priority seeks to capture." Id. at 190-91 (emphasis in original).
Although I cannot develop the point here, I find the metaphor of local priorityfor I take it to be no more than a metaphor-somewhat more mysterious and less
analytically helpful than Schauer supposes it to be.
41 See id. at 200.
42 According to Schauer, "rules of thumb" are prescriptive generalizations that
offer "no independent reasons for decision when they indicate results other than

those indicated by the direct application of [their underlying justifications]."
Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 648.
43 See id. at 648-49.
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Against this challenge to the claim that our legal system (among
others) makes important use of regulatory rules that forbid or at least
restrict all-things-considered decisionmaking, Schauer offers his theory of presumptive positivism: 44 Rules bind, but only up to a point.
Or, in Schauer's vocabulary, the force of those legal rules that are
distinctively recognized as such under accepted rules of recognition 45
or similar "pedigree" tests is "presumptive" only.46 Somewhat more

specifically, the prescriptive force of legal rules is capable of being
overcome in cases in which the moral, political, or practical costs of
applying a rule would be too large and unacceptable. 47 In such cases,
Schauer argues, the legal rule ceases to bind, and a judge or other
decisionmaker is authorized to do whatever seems best to him or her,
in light of the full range of moral and other norms recognized within
the society.
Among its virtues, Schauer's theory of presumptive positivism
draws attention to, and begins the process of providing a plausible
reconciliation of, what I take to be two widely shared understandings
of competent lawyers. On the one hand, rules-largely as a result of
their literal or semantic applicability-frequently determine outcomes. On the other hand, literalism has its limits; good judges will
often, if not usually, find a way to avoid outcomes that would involve
serious injustices or frustrate important public policies.
Nevertheless, Schauer's account leaves open a number of questions, one of which seems to me to be of foremost importance: are the
weight and nature of the considerations adequate to justify a rejection
or modification of a legal rule, or the recognition of an exception,
44 See SCHAUER, PLAYING

BY THE RuLEs,

supra note 2, at 203-06; Schauer, Rules,

supra note 3, at 674-79.
45 The term "rule of recognition," which can be traced to H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 94-95 (2d ed. 1994), refers to "common public standards" accepted by a
legal system's relevant officials for determining what the law is. Id.

46

See SCHAUER,

PLAYING BY THE

RuLEs, supra note 2, at 204 ("Presumptive positiv-

ism is a way of describing the interplay between a pedigreed subset of rules and the
full (and non-pedigreeable)
normative universe, such that the former
is . . . presumptively controlling in [a] not-necessarily-epistemic sense of presumptive."); Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 674-77.
47 Schauer has offered slightly varying specifications of the conditions under
which the presumption for applying an applicable legal rule might be overcome. See
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 2, at 196 (referring to considerations of
"exceptional strength,"); id. (calling for displacement in light of "particularly exigent
reasons"); id. at 205 ("[T]he rule will be set aside when the result it indicates is egregiously at odds with the result that is indicated by [a] larger and more morally acceptable set of values."); Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 676 (stating that a result indicated
by a rule should be reached in the absence of "a reason of great strength for not
reaching [the] result").
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themselves specified by law? 48 If so, Schauer's position could be ex-

pressed by saying that the applicability of a particular rule can be determined only in light of the whole body of law-a position not far
from Ronald Dworkin's. But this account would substantially diminish the discontinuity between rule-bound and non-rule-bound decisionmaking that the theory of presumptive positivism seems intended
49
to portray. Schauer appears to reject it.
Another possibility is that the considerations adequate to override an otherwise applicable rule are not in fact specified by law: the
judge or other decisionmaker is empowered to make an all-thingsconsidered judgment of when, in his or her view, the costs of obedience would be too great.50 This position, however, would bring difficulties of its own. Among other things, it would generate an obvious
tension between presumptive positivism, which holds that judges are
excused from their legal obligations to follow the rules in cases in
which the costs of rule-following would appear (to them) to be too
high, and another of Schauer's recurring themes, much emphasized
in The Second-Best FirstAmendment, that perhaps the central function of
legal rules is to allocate power. If a principal purpose of legal rules is
to allocate power, and in particular to bind judges based on a distrust
of their capacity to make sound, all-things-considered decisions, it
would be somewhat odd to authorize judges to reject substantive rules
as unacceptable in cases that the judges believe to be of high consequence, but not in more trivial cases. 5 1
48 See GeraldJ. Postema, Positivism, I Presume? ...Comments on Schauer's "Rules and
the Rule of Law", 14 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 797, 813 n.23 (1991) (raising a similar
question). Schauer appears not to regard the question as particularly important. See
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, sup a

note 2, at 205--06

Whether we call [the] array of overriding factors 'law' or not is a dispute that
is to some extent terminological. It is also a dispute, however, that goes to
the rhetoric of legality, to the extent to which legal decision-makers relying
on a non-pedigreeable universe of social norms shall when doing so be buttressed by the connotations of deduction, constraint, and limited domain
suggested by the word 'law.' I will explore this question no further here ....
In Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 677 n.70, Schauer responds directly to Professor
Postema's question. Schauer frames the issue as one contested by Ronald Dworkin
and Melvin Eisenberg and observes that Eisenberg "seems to be correct" that judges
may displace pedigreed legal rules in service of any of "the full set of normative propositions or sources accepted by the society at large." Id.
49 See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 677 n.70.
50 This seems to be Schauer's view. See id.
51 See MargaretJane Radin, PresumptivePositivismand Trivial Cases, 14 HARv.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 823, 832 (1991). Curiously, Schauer himself has made a similar criticism
of the theory that he calls "rule-sensitive particularism," under which

1400

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 72:5

There might of course be other reasons, not fundamentally based
in concerns about likely judicial error and a desire to allocate power
in such a way as to achieve "second-best" results, for giving judges
more authority in relatively important cases than in relatively unimportant cases. These might include interests in predictability and ease
of decisionmaking, which might be thought to be outweighed in momentous but not trivial disputes,5 2 as well as a desire to preserve public
confidence that judges as much as citizens are subject to the rule of
law. Nonetheless, if rules bind only in trivial cases, the force of one of
Schauer's central claims would be significantly undermined. Or
would it?
If rules allocate power by limiting the authority of decisionmakers
to make all-things-considered judgments, there is clearly no reason to
think that all legal decisionmakers should be afforded equal authority
53
to reject, or create an exception to, an otherwise applicable rule.

Most of us want cops on the beat simply to obey duly propounded
constitutional rules.5 4 We might be willing to trust judges with a
somewhat greater authority to make all-things-considered judgments
rules are rules of thumb in the sense of being transparent to their substantive justifications, but in which their very existence and effect as rules of
thumb become a factor to be considered in determining whether the rules
should be set aside when the results they indicated diverged from the results
indicated by direct application of their substantive justifications.
Schauer, Second-Best FirstAmendment, supra note 1, at 20 n.53. According to Schauer:
If the virtues of "ruleness" are seen to reside primarily in [distrust of particular decisionmakers], then the difference between rule-sensitive particularism
and the stronger form of rule-based decisionmaking I have been using ...becomes enormously important. If we are guided by a concern that
certain decisionmakers should not be making certain kinds of decisions,
such as the decision that this instance of speech is not one that serves the
purpose of having freedom of speech, then authorizing a decisionmaker to
determine whether this is the kind of decision with respect to which she
should not be trusted appears, although not logically inconceivable, nevertheless psychologically bizarre. . . .If we do not trust a decisionmaker to
determine x,then we can hardly trust that decisionmaker to determine that
this is a case in which the reasons for disabling that decisionmaker from
determining x either do not apply or are outweighed.
Id.; see also SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 98.
52 The characterization comes from Radin, supra note 51.
53 See Schauer, Rules, supranote 3, at 679-91; Schauer, Second-Best FirstAmendment,
supra note 1, at 14-22.
54 See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 684; cf Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment;
supra note 1, at 15 (noting widespread reluctance to entrust "members of the Chicago
Police Department" with the authority to decide on an all-things-considered basis
"whether to remove an offensive painting of a popular former mayor from the walls of
the School of the Art Institute").
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about what would be best.5 5 And we might, I suppose, think that
judges of the highest court within ajurisdiction, such as the Supreme
Court, should have even greater lawful authority to reject a rule or
craft a new one in order to achieve an important good or avoid a
serious harm.5 6
Resisting Dworkin's sometimes titanic influence, 57 Schauer
presses the idea-which has seemed obvious to such positivists as
H.L.A. Hart,58 but seems implicitly to be rejected out of hand in much
constitutional theorizing-that courts might best be understood as
sometimes exercising lawmaking power within our legal system. 5 9 But
what kind of lawmakers might courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, be?
Consider two possibilities, each based on an analogy. Article V of
the Constitution authorizes "We the People," acting pursuant to specified forms, to make new constitutional rules in a way that is at least
broadly unbounded by substantive law.60 So let us assume, for sake of

argument, that "We the People," when engaged in constitutional lawmaking through the prescribed forms, can make law of any substan55
56

See Schauer, Second-Best First Amendment, supra note 1, at 17-21.
See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 687; Schauer, Second-Best FirstAmendmen

supra note 1, at 18-21. Schauer is emphatic, however, that such a judgment, if it
could reasonably be reached at all, could not be reached "acontextually"; it would
need to reflect a judgment, amorng other matters, that the people likely to be judges
of the highest court would be likely to exercise their revisionary power in laudable
ways. See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 689.
57 Schauer frames his theory of presumptive positivism at least partly in response
to what he characterizes as Dworkin's "powerful attack on [other forms of] positivism." SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 200.
58 See HART, supra note 45.
59 See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 682-91.
60 The Constitution purports to preclude possible amendments aimed at altering
the states' equal representation in the Senate, see U.S. CONST. art. V, and the Constitution as originally enacted barred the adoption of certain amendments affecting slavery and the slave trade before 1808, id.
A lively debate exists as to whether there are other substantive limits on the
amendment authority. For the view that amendments inconsistent with the basic, underlying values of the existing Constitution would be invalid, see, for example, JOHN
RAWLS,

PoLmcAL LIBERALISM 239 (1993); Walter F. Murphy, Merlin's Memory: The Past

and FutureImperfect of the Once and FuturePolity, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE
THEORY AND PRAGrICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note 4, at 163; Walter
Dellinger, The Legitimacy of ConstitutionalChange: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97

H.Av. L. REv. 386 (1983). For the opposing view, see John R. Vile, The Case Against
Implicit Limits on the ConstitutionalAmending Process, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION:
THE THEORY AND PRACTmE OF CONsrrTnoTAL AMENDMENT, supra note 4, at 191; Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a RestrainedJudicialRole

97 HARv.L. REv. 433 (1983).

1402

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 72:5

tive content that the super-majorities required by Article V happen to
prefer 6I-in other words, that "We the People" possess a substantively
unlimited lawmaking power.62 Is it plausible to imagine that the
Supreme Court, when the presumption for applying established rules
is overcome, possesses a comparably unbounded lawmaking authority? I think not. It seems most unlikely that Supreme Court Justices
experience themselves as possessing this kind of legally conferred authority. 63 Vesting such power in the Supreme Court would seem
equally implausible as a matter of institutional design.
A second analogy would be to a legislature. Legislatures of
course possess lawmaking powers, but those lawmaking powers are
themselves bounded by law (the Constitution). So it might be with
the Supreme Court. When the presumption for applying established
rules is overcome, the Supreme Court might be empowered to craft a
new rule, but might continue to be subject to legal constraints. 64 The
Court might be required, for example, to provide a reasoned justification of how its result comported with deep constitutional values taken
to be controlling. Or it might be subject to felt requirements not to
craft a rule that intruded excessively on the traditional prerogatives of
another branch of government. Or, to take a different kind of example, it might regard itself as constrained not to rely on contested religious premises as grounds for decision.
On this view of the Supreme Court's authority, the Court, like
other lawmakers, would be bound, but not necessarily determined, by
law; and it might proceed frankly on the hypothesis that its authority
has an explicitly lawmaking aspect. Moreover, on this view, it would
61

See U.S. CoNsT. art. V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary,
shall propose Amendments to the Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents
and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by
the Congress.

Id.
62 This assumption, which I make for purposes of simplification, is in fact contested, see supra note 60, and I mean to take no stand on its ultimate validity.
63 Within the Hartian framework that Schauer generally accepts, rules or practices of recognition are identified by reference to the behaviors and attitudes of relevant officials. See HART, supra note 45, at 144-50.

64 This was certainly the view of the most celebrated modern positivist, H.Lj.
Hart, as he made clear in a postscript to the second edition of THE CONCEPT OF LAW,
supra note 45, at 272-74.
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perhaps not be as odd as I suggested earlier for a legal system to authorize its highest court, as a matter of law, to reject otherwise applicable legal rules on occasions of high consequence. Upon the bursting
of the positivist presumption, it would not be the case that the judges
could simply do as they thought best, whatever that might happen to
be. The resulting authority or discretion would still be circumscribed
in ways that might seem acceptable to a rule-making authority concerned about allocating too much all-things-considered decisionmaking power to judges, including Justices of the Supreme Court.
As I have suggested, I think an account such as this might be generally consistent with the theory of presumptive positivism, as well as
with Schauer's repeated claim that a central function of legal rules is
to allocate power based on a distrust of those who, in the absence of
substantive regulatory rules, would be required to render all-thingsconsidered decisions. 65 On the other hand, I do not think that presumptive positivism has been developed sufficiently for it to be entirely clear how the melding of my suggested account with Schauer's
theory might be effected. Somewhat more specifically, I think presumptive positivism needs a richer account of the nature of and the
relationships among (i) the substantive legal rules that are presumptively binding; (ii) the second-order rules or norms specifying the
kinds of considerations to which those substantive rules may yield; and
(iii) the rules, norms, or practices that structure judicial decisionmaking, especially by highest courts, in cases in which the presumption
calling for adherence to first-order substantive rules is overcome.
Were Schauer to develop presumptive positivism in this way, my
strong suspicion is that the line between rule application and judicial
lawmaking would be blurred considerably in many of the cases with
which he is most concerned, as would the distinction between "pedigreed" legal norms and other social norms to which a judge can appeal. 66 Without pretending to develop a fully adequate account of my

own, I shall say a few more words about these matters below.
65 One sentence in Schauer's book, Playing by the Rules, is especially suggestive in
this respect: "When a decision-maker makes a decision based on only a limited
number of factors, that decision-maker is operating in a world in which rules have
allocated the determination of other factors to someone else or to some other person
or institution." SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 231.
66 Cf HART, supra note 45, at 247 (recognizing that, under a positivist theory, "the
ultimate criteria of legal validity might explicitly incorporate besides pedigree, principles ofjustice or substantive moral values"). Schauer hints at the possibility that the
bursting of the presumption for rule-following does not mark a stark divide between,
on the one hand, cases in which judges are bound to follow the law and, on the other
hand, cases in which their authority to make all-things-considered judgments over-

runs the restraints and collapses the distinctions that the word "law" characteristically
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B. Presumptive Positivism and the "Limited Domain" Thesis
Although less than wholly satisfied with the account of the role of
rules in American law that is offered in Playing by the Rules, I am sincere in professing admiration. The general subject area is one in
which alternative perspectives and conceptualizations seem to me to
have illuminating capacity. As I have suggested already, the towering
influence is Dworkin, whose highly idealized account suggests that
every act of law application depends at least implicitly on a legal theory that takes account of all the principles reflected in a legal system's
entire body of law. 67 If not "argumentatively impeccable,"68 Dworkin's theory is at least plausible in its main outlines and elegantly majestic in scope. But it also operates, by design and without apology, at
some distance from psychological and sociological reality. 69 For Hercules, Schauer substitutes more fallible decisionmakers with more recognizably human psychologies; in rules, Schauer's decisionmakers
find aid in doing their jobs efficiently, as well as some comfort in es-

caping a sense of personal responsibility to perform refined, morally
freighted calculations in every case. Focused on the experience of
rules "in law and in life," Schauer at least illustrates that legal decisionmaking can profitably be seen from angles other than Dworkin'sand maybe that, in describing what goes on, there could be no fully
successful separation of theory and data.
It is less clear to me, however, that Schauer's account of the nature of rules and their characteristic functions in American law contributes usefully to the particular jurisprudential debate that he seems
most concerned to join. This is the debate between proponents of a
marks. See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULEs, supra note 2, at 205-06. But, having
raised the question, he declines to pursue it:
Whether we call [the] array of overriding factors [that sometimes allow the
displacement of otherwise applicable legal rules] "law" or not is a dispute
that is to some extent terminological. It is also a dispute, however, that goes
to the rhetoric of legality, to the extent to which legal decision-makers relying on a non-pedigreeable universe of social norms shall when doing so be
buttressed by the connotations of deduction, constraint, and limited domain
suggested by the word "law." I will explore this question no further here,
and conclude this chapter only with the descriptive assertion that presumptive positivism may be the most accurate picture of the place of rules within
many modem legal systems.
Id.
67 See DWORKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supranote 23, at 225-58.
68 Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 671.
69 See DWORaN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 23, at 265 ("No doubt real judges decide most cases in a much less methodical way. But [the theoretical construct of an
ideal judge] shows us the hidden structure of their judgments.").
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species of "positive positivism" 70 and their opponents about whether,
as a descriptive matter, law consists entirely of a set of distinctively
"legal" rules and other norms that are sharply differentiated, at least

in principle, from the broader set of "social norms" extant within a
community. 71 According to the kind of positive positivism that
Schauer seems concerned to explicate, if not partly defend, "law" is a
"limited domain" 72 of norms recognized as such by the "the rule of
recognition"7 3 or some similar "pedigree" test that definitively separates law from nonlaw. 74 More pointedly, the positivism with which

Schauer is concerned holds that many of the norms that are commonly used in moral, political, and prudential arguments are not part
of the law, and can have no role in proper "legal" reasoning.
If I understand his point correctly, Schauer believes that pre-

sumptive positivism illustrates the partial truth of "positive positivism"
and the limited domain thesis in the following way: 75 Insofar as rules
are not outweighed by supervening considerations, the central claim
underlying the limited domain thesis holds; the applicable law consists solely of pedigreed rules, and a decisionmaker is required to respect the authority of those rules. Insofar, however, as determining
whether the presumptive authority of rules is overcome requires resort to all-things-considered decisionmaking, and insofar as decision-

making after the presumption is defeated is similarly open-ended, the
limited domain thesis is false.
70 SeeJules Coleman, Negative and PositivePositivism, 11J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1982);
Jules Coleman, Rules and Social Facts, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 715 (1991).
According to Coleman, "negative positivism" denies that there is any necessary connection between law and morals, whereas "positive positivism" asserts some affirmative
claim about the actual or necessary nature of law.
71 See SCHAUER, PLAYING By THE RULES, supra note 2, at 199.
72 See Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666-67, 670 n.49, 676.
73 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 198.
74 As Schauer explains:
[T]he heart of positivism lies... in the concept of systemic isolation. To the
positivist, there can be systems whose norms are identified by reference to
some identifier that can distinguish legal norms from other norms, such as
those of politics, morality, economics, or etiquette. This identifier, which
Hart refers to as the "rule of recognition" and Dworkin labels a "pedigree,"
picks out legal norms from the universe of other norms, and thus provides a
test for legal validity. If a norm is so selected, it is a valid legal norm,
notwithstanding its moral repugnance, economic inconsistency, or political

folly.
Id. at 199; see also Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666.
75 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra note 2, at 204-06; Schauer, Rules,
supra note 3, at 678-79.
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This account seems to me less helpful, and possibly less accurate,
than Schauer appears to think. To begin with what may be a semantic
quibble (and possibly one invited by my own attempt to reconstruct
Schauer's argument, rather than the argument itself), I do not think
that Schauer has done anything to save or defend the limited domain
thesis. On the contrary, if his account is accepted, the limited domain
thesis is false. The limited domain thesis, in the terms in which
Schauer initially presents it, holds that "there is a limited domain of
pedigreeable legal norms that is not extensionally equivalent to the
totality of then-available social norms" 7 6 and that "if there is a legally
pedigreed rule that applies to the case at hand, then it should be employed to produce the result."77 By explicitly recognizing that
nonpedigreed norms can sometimes override otherwise applicable
pedigreed78 norms, and by further acknowledging that it takes at least
"a peek" at the full set of nonpedigreed norms to determine
whether they are in fact overriding in any particular case, presumptive
positivism would most naturally be taken as rejecting a central claim
of the limited domain thesis.
Schauer attempts to rescue part of the limited domain thesis by
recasting it in psychological terms: judges frequently experience a
rule as binding, without conducting the all-things-considered calculation necessary to determine whether it really is binding. 79 He suggests
that it is this phenomenology, rather than the legal ontology, that
matters.8 0 I am doubtful, however, whether Schauer's phenomenological claim, even if true, meets either the proponents or the opponents of the limited domain thesis on their own ground. On the
contrary, the psychological experience described by Schauer could
easily be cited as part of an explanation of how judges sometimes err
in their decisions: they may fail to see that a "pedigreed" rule is outweighed by a nonpedigreed consideration, when in fact, as a matter of
law, it is outweighed (under a theory, such as Dworkin's, which holds
that what the law is or requires cannot be determined by exclusive
reference to "pedigrees").81
Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 666 n.41.
SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 2, at 200.
See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supra note 2, at 204-05; Schauer, Rules,
supra note 3, at 677.
79 See SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RuLEs, supranote 2, at 204-05.
80 Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 671-77.
81 Cf Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraintin Adjudication:A Critical Phenomenology, 36J. LEGAL EDUC. 518, 544-45 (1986) (explaining how efforts to imagine and
develop legal arguments can change ajudge's preliminary view about how a case must
be decided as a matter of law).
76

77
78
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In short, if Schauer's general account of the nature and functions
of regulatory rules is true, then the "limited domain" thesis is not
partly true as a descriptive matter, but simply false.
III.

AMENDING THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF A CONSTITUTION

Among the central questions addressed by contributors to a recent book, Responding to Imperfection,8 2.is whether it is possible for the
Constitution of the United States to be amended other than through
the devices provided by Article V. In influential writings over more
than a decade, Professors Bruce Ackerman 83 and Akhil Arnar 84 have
advanced ingenious arguments that the specific mechanisms of
amendment referred to in Article V should not be viewed as constitutionally exclusive. In support of his interpretation, Ackerman, in particular, has argued that a theory treating the Article V amendment
mechanisms as nonexclusive is necessary to explain how profound
changes in constitutional understanding-such as those associated
with the Supreme Court's acceptance of New Deal constitutionalism
in 1937 and thereafter-could be constitutionally legitimate. 8 5 On
the other side, a number of Article V "exclusivists" maintain that the
amendment mechanisms specifically authorized by the Constitution
provide the only constitutionally legitimate means of effecting consti86
tutional change.
87
In his article, Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution,
Schauer notes a crucial assumption that is seemingly shared by all participants in the ongoing debate. Both "exclusivists" and "nonexclusivists" assume that the question how the Constitution may
legitimately be amended must be decided by interpretation of the
Constitution itself; properly interpreted, it either does or does not
permit amendment by means other than those specified in Article
V.88 Having identified this shared assumption, Schauer very insightfully challenges it. Building on Hans Kelsen's notion of a
82 See RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTTEUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note 4.

83 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
AcRx--AN, WE TmE PEOPLE]; Bruce Ackerman, The StorrsLectures: Discoveringthe Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures].
84 See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution
Outside Article V,55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043 (1988).
85 See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 83; Ackerman, Storr Lectures, supra
note 83.
86 See, e.g., Dellinger, supra note 60; Tribe, supra note 60.
87 Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 4.
88 See id. at 146-47.
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"Grundnorm" and H.L.A. Hart's concept of a "rule of recognition,"8 9
Schauer argues that the chain of legal justifications for our constitutional practices must at some point run out. The Constitution is law,
not because it says it is, but because relevant members of the society,
as a matter of social fact, accept it as such. 90 The social fact of acceptance is, in Schauer's term, a "presupposition" of constitutionalism and
of debates about what is legitimate "under" the Constitution. But if
the social fact of acceptance ultimately makes the Constitution law,
91
acceptance also ultimately determines what the Constitution is.
Once this is recognized, Schauer continues, it becomes obvious that
what we accept as "the Constitution" need not be perfectly coextensive
with the words inscribed in the printed Constitution. Then comes his
conclusion:
The process of constitutional amendment, therefore, can take
place on one of two levels. On the constitutional level, it can take
place within the contours of the constitution itself.... But because
constitutions owe their "constitutionality" to logically and politically
antecedent conditions, the process of constitutional amendment
may also take place at another level, when these logically and politi92
cally antecedent conditions are themselves amended.
Schauer's effort to focus attention on the context of constitutionalism-the context in which constitutional amendment and constitutional interpretation are possible, and in which debates about
amendment and interpretation are meaningful-marks an important
advance. Debates about the possibility of constitutional "amendment," as opposed to revolution or replacement, make sense only
within a functioning legal system. Moreover, the "practices" of recognition that are the logical antecedents of legal validity within our legal
system are complex and diverse. 93 We recognize or accept the written
document called "the Constitution" as law, but we also appear to accept as authoritative-as definitive of the Constitution's meaningany sociologically plausible decision rendered by the Supreme Court.
In other words, it is part of our practice to accept as constitutionally
valid (or invalid) nearly anything that the Supreme Court, at least
89

See id. at 149-52. By his own account, Schauer draws primarily on

SEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE
HART, supra note 45, at 97-114, 245-47.

HANS KEL-

115-36 (Anders Wedberg trans., 1961), and

90 See Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 4, at 152-53.
91 See id. at 153-57.
92 Id. at 160-61.
93 See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 621 (1987).
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when acting within sociologically established bounds of plausibility,
says is valid (or invalid).
Because the general public seems so accepting of the interpretive
authority asserted by the Supreme Court, and so disposed to equate
"the meaning" of the Constitution with the Supreme Court's interpretations of it, the most crucial question for many practical purposes
involves the practices of recognition of the Justices of the Supreme
Court. Suppose, then, that the question is whether-to translate
Bruce Ackerman's question into the terms that Schauer commendsthe presuppositions of American constitutionalism were amended in
the 1930s so that, among other things, certain restrictions on governmental regulation under "constitutional" provisions such as the Due
Process and Contracts Clauses would no longer be recognized as part
of the Constitution binding as law.
If we were to seek an answer to this question in the practices of
the Justices of the Supreme Court, I think it would quickly become
apparent that the question could not be answered in the form in
which it was put. In one sense, the Court continues to "accept" the
same Constitution (in relevant respects) that existed before 1937.
Aside from subsequently ratified "formal" amendments, the words in
what is universally taken to be the canonical inscription of the Constitution remain the same; any competent legal opinion must state or
presuppose a theory that reconciles the conclusion that is reached
with the words of the text. In another sense, however, the purposes
and demands of the Due Process and Contracts Clauses, for example,
are typically described differently than they were before. Different,
mid-level principles or tests are viewed as capturing these provisions'
meanings. In addition, precedent has accreted, and many cases will
be resolved on the basis of precedent, with direct argument over first
principles-over the question whether the precedents have under94
stood the Constitution correctly-occurring only rarely.
To my mind, however, the crucial point would be that we make
something like a category mistake if we press the question whether a
change in the way that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution
amends the Constitution. Schauer equates the presuppositions of con-

stitutionalism with social fact. But Supreme Court interpretive practice cannot be put into any simple category of social fact; interpretive

94 See David Strauss, Common Law ConstitutionalInterpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REv.
877 (1996).
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norms themselves call for justification, 95 and what will count as an adequate justification depends (in the first instance at least) on shared
understandings that help to constitute the relatively familiar framework of constitutional discourse. 9 6 By contrast, constitutional
"amendment," as that term is most naturally and usefully understood,
needs to be justified within a different political practice and a correspondingly different framework of discourse. 97 Amendment, unlike
interpretation, may need no substantive justification whatsoever as a
matter of law; formal satisfaction of constitutionally prescribed procedural requirements may suffice.
The same point can be put in a different way. Within the practice
of American constitutionalism, it is presupposed that the criteria for
constitutional identity or sameness generally are satisfied in the absence of a written alteration of the written text. We have the "same"
Constitution that we had in 1936, explicit amendments aside, despite
enormous changes in our understanding of what the Constitution
95 Cf Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to Imperfection?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 839, 860-69 (1996) (arguing that the "presuppositions" of constitutional argument require justification).
96 For a sophisticated account of the nature and processes ofjustification in law,
see DENNIS PArTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996).
97 But see Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States ConstitutionBeen
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27: Accountingfor ConstitutionalChange, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECrION: THE THEORY AND PRAaCICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, supra note 4, at 13 (arguing that constitutional "amendments" can and should

be differentiated from constitutional "interpretations" by reference to whether they
can be "derived" from the previously existing constitutional text in light of accepted
interpretive conventions and by the degree of substantive change that they introduce
into constitutional law). I agree with Professor Levinson that some developments in
constitutional doctrine are sufficiently discontinuous with previous understandings
that they ideally should be effected through constitutional amendment, if at all. Nor
am I unsympathetic, in principle, to his effort to develop a vocabulary to distinguish
such changes from the kind of elaboration or adjustment associated with "ordinary"
constitutional interpretation. I fear, however, that only confusion will follow from
using the term "amendment" to embrace doctrinal discontinuities arising solely from
judicial decisionmaking, as well as discontinuities arising from a formal alteration of
the constitutional text pursuant to Article V. Among other things, alterations arising
from Article V procedures possess both a democratic legitimacy and a textually based
claim to immunity from judicial reconsideration that comparably revolutionary judicial decisions do not.
This objection would apply with somewhat less force against a theory, such as
Bruce Ackerman's, that sharply distinguished between "formal amendments" and "informal amendments" and that established criteria for participation by "We the People," not merely courts, in the process necessary for "informal amendments'-as
opposed to judge-driven doctrinal revolutions-to occur. SeeAcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, supra note 83; Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 83.
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means 98 -just as, for example, Bill Clinton holds "the same" office
that George Washington held, even though there have been enormous changes in the scope of presidential duties and powers.
Schauer is right, of course, that changes in what he calls the
presuppositions of constitutionalism-which is to say, changes in the
complex network of practices through which the Constitution is recognized as law, interpreted, and enforced-will inevitably, and not
necessarily illegitimately, produce changes in prevailing understandings of what the Constitution forbids or requires. This an important
point for anyone who wants to understand American constitutionalism,99 and it should not be overlooked by those interested in processes
,ofconstitutional amendment. Nonetheless, a changed understanding
of the written Constitution is not itself an "amendment" of the Constitution; changed understandings are subject to a kind of legitimacy
challenge that constitutional amendments are not. 0 0 If we want a

better understanding of the relationship between changed understandings and constitutional amendments, we will do well to begin by
keeping them conceptually distinct, if only to make possible both contrast and comparison.
IV.

DICHOTOMOUS THEORIZING

The problem with a sharply dichotomous theory of constitutional
amendments parallels that with presumptive positivism: within our
98 See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Foreword: Revolutions?,
109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 33 (1995).
99 For example, as the extensive literature on constitutional "originalism" makes
clear, our constitutional law has departed from "original understandings" in many
crucial areas. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: Tim PoLTICAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 19-128 (1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 727-39 (1988). Moreover, as Schauer's
analytical apparatus usefully helps to demonstrate, there is nothing necessarily "illegitimate" about this development. Legal "legitimacy" must ultimately be measured at
least partly by reference to norms that, as a matter of social fact, are accepted as
legally controlling. Indeed, I think the argument can be pressed further: The relevant norms within our society could, and I would argue do, both validate (some) nonoriginalist interpretation as legally "legitimate" and, what is more, sometimes call for
reference to explicitly moral considerations in resolving interpretive questions, including interpretive questions about how contested interpretive norms are appropriately specified. If so, it is a contingent fact about the American legal system that the
question what the governing interpretive norms actually are is partly a question of
political morality. It is also a contingent fact that debates about what the governing
interpretive norms ought to be is at least partly internal to constitutional law.
100 SeeLessig, supra note 95, at 860-69 (arguing that the significance of alterations
in the presuppositions of constitutional practice is largely a normative, not a positive
question).

NOTRE DAME LAW

1412

REVIEW

[VOL. 72:5

legal system, there is no sharp divide between applying or specifying
the content of legal norms, on the one hand, and abandoning or altering them in service of extra-legal norms on the other. To this
claim, Schauer might object that his aim is to enhance understanding
precisely by drawing analytical distinctions that cut against the grain of
what is usually thought. But this response, I think, would be a mistake. In my view, the great strength of Schauer's jurisprudential work
is as what Hart called "descriptive sociology." 1 0 ' His interest is in how
10 2
rules work, in life and the legal system, not just in adjudication.
Analyzed from this perspective, the legal system in general is a device
for the allocation of power within a society, and adjudication by highest courts is just one aspect of this device. As a matter of descriptive
sociology, courts-dangerous though they may be-remain "the least
dangerous branch" 0 3 within the American legal system. A good descriptive sociology must, I think, explain in fuller detail how the congeries of forces underlying what Hart called "rules of recognition"
help to maintain this dynamic equilibrium as a matter of law.
V.

PRESUPPOSITIONS, MEANING, AND PRESUMPTIVE POSITIVISM

Although I have criticized Amending the Presuppositionsof a Constitution, it should be clear that I agree totally with what I take to be its
main point: what the law is ultimately depends on practices of acceptance not all of which, as a logical matter, can themselves be justified as
a matter of law. I am uncertain, however, how the implications of this
position relate to some of the claims about the nature of legal rules
advanced in Playingby the Rules. In Playing by the Rules, Schauer asserts
that the meaning of legal rules is given by relatively acontextual rules
of semantics. 10 4 To know the meaning of a legal rule-or whether,
for example, it applies to particular facts-our principal touchstone
must be whether the words in which the rule is expressed would be
understood as subsuming those facts by a competent speaker of English with little or no awareness of the specific context in which the rule
was propounded or its application was being considered.
In Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution, by contrast,
Schauer is at least saying that the asserted status of a norm as a legal
norm cannot be determined "acontexually" in any plausible sense of
101 HART, supra note 45, at v-vi.
102 Cf Schauer, Rules, supra note 3, at 671 (rejecting accounts ofjudicial decisionmaking that are "argumentatively impeccable" on the ground that they are "phenomenologically false").
103 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).

104 See SCHAUER,

PLAYING BY THE RuLEs,

supra note 2, at 53-62, 207-18.
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that term, but instead requires examination of social facts. And if this
is so, it would seem to follow that the meaning of a legal norm must
also depend on matters of social fact-on what the rule, or rules of a
similar kind, are accepted as meaning within the legal practice of a
particular society. The alternative view, that rules must either be accepted as bearing their "acontextual" meaning or not be accepted at
all, would be a claim about the "necessary" nature of law that seems
implausible on its face.
If, however, the meaning of legal norms depends on the rules,
conventions, or understandings of a society's legal practice, it becomes plausible to think that legal "meaning" is not as relatively acontextual as Schauer suggests in Playingly the Rules.10 5 More pointedly, it
becomes plausible to think that a legal rule saying "no driving over 55
miles per hour," when properly interpreted, simply does not apply to
a vehicle rushing a heart attack victim to the hospital. On this view,
the appropriate characterization is not, as Schauer's theory of presumptive positivism would suggest, that the rule must yield to supervening social norms of very great weight. The point, rather, would be
that the meaning of the rule, in law, depends on actual and ascribed
purposes in light of common understandings, assumptions about the
bounds of reasonableness, and the surrounding body of law.
In offering this suggestion, which seems to me to be invited
(though not entailed) by Amending the Presuppositionsof a Constitution,I
do not mean to deny Schauer's point that the jurisdictional rules of
our legal practice may sometimes authorize judges to go beyond what
could fairly be characterized as "interpretation" and to displace or
modify legal rules in the service of other norms. I merely mean to
suggest that "legal meaning" may diverge in important ways from relatively acontextual linguistic meaning and that the bounds of "legal
interpretation" may therefore be somewhat broader than Schauer
suggests.
Again, Schauer might object that his account has clarificatory
power that my suggested alternative does not. Again, however, my
guess would be that the "phenomenology" is on my side, not his-that
judges, lawyers, and other participants in the legal system much more
commonly experience themselves as struggling to support an "interpretation" that they find acceptable than as struggling over the ques105 Cf Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions,supra note 4, at 160 ("A society could,
for example, shift from a literal to a nonliteral understanding of its [constitutional]
amendment provisions, and given the prevalence of nonformal and nonliteral modes
of legal and constitutional interpretation in the United States, this may in fact be what
has happened.").
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tion whether a rule should be displaced or amended to avoid socially
unacceptable consequences. Such an understanding, in turn, may
again be relevant to the psychological and sociological forces that
maintain the judiciary as "the least dangerous branch."
VI.

CONCLUSION

Unsystematic ruminations could scarcely do justice to Fred
Schauer's rich body of work, and I do not pretend to have done so. I
would conclude by calling attention to a matter of intellectual style
that may help to explain some of the disagreements that I have
expressed.
Throughout his legal, philosophical, and jurisprudential writings,
Schauer characteristically propounds bold theses. Once the tangle of
familiar arguments and confusions is sorted through, he presents
sharp, provocative claims about how things either are or ought to be.
Schauer's sharply etched conclusions reflect a distinctive intellectual
approach, which I assume reflects a belief that bold, memorable generalizations are likely to be more helpful in organizing thought than
more complex and qualified claims that are difficult to remember,
apply, or test. My own intellectual style tends in the opposite direction-as the ruminations offered in this essay may abundantly illustrate. It may be a small indication of the power of Schauer's work that
it consistently challenges and engages even someone with so different
a cast of mind.
In any event, as I suggested at the outset, many of my quarrels
with Schauer's views about particular issues have resulted from my
grappling with his equally provocative and important positions on
other topics. His contributions to legal scholarship are many and various, and no one who cares about legal theory can afford to take his
work other than seriously.

